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International capital  market  integration has  become  the  subject of  major 
theoretical and practical interest in recent times. Policymakers are becoming 
more  and  more  aware  of  the  potential  benefits  accruing  from  such 
integration, which allows more efficient allocations of investment and saving 
between  the  domestic  and  the  foreign  market.  In  particular,  with  the 
prospective comprehensive integration of capital markets in Europe in 1992, 
some key policy issues arise. 
The financial, monetary, and exchange rate management policy implica- 
tions of capital market integration have been widely discussed in the context 
of  the European Monetary System (EMS) (see, e.g., the survey in Micossi 
1988). However, capital market integration also has profound effects on the 
fiscal branch of each country separately and on the scope of tax coordination 
among them. These issues have not been dealt with extensively so far. The 
present paper attempts to contribute to the economic analysis in this area. 
The opening up of  an economy to international capital movements affects, 
as expected, the size and the structure of the fiscal branch of its government. 
Capital flows influence both the optimal structure of taxes, on domestic and 
foreign-source income,  and  the  welfare cost of  taxation.  As  a result,  the 
optimal size of government (the optimal provision of public goods) and the 
magnitude of its redistribution (transfer) policies are affected as well. In this 
context,  the  paper  analyzes  the  effects  of  relaxing  restrictions  on  the 
international flow of capital on the fiscal branch of  government. 
Assaf  Razin is the  Ross Professor of International Economics at Tel-Aviv University and a 
research associate of the National Bureau of  Economic Research. Efraim Sadka is professor of 
Economics at Tel-Aviv University. 
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The optimal size of government, or, more precisely, the optimal provision 
of public goods, must be determined by  an appropriate cost-benefit analysis. 
Such an  analysis implies that  the marginal cost of  public  funds must  be 
equated to the marginal utility from public goods. Accordingly, in order to 
find the effect of  liberalization in the  international capital markets on the 
optimal  quantity  of  public  goods,  we  study  here  the  effect  of  such  a 
liberaiization on the  cost of  public  funds. This is done in section 9.4,  in 
which we  also distinguish between constant and variable internal terms of 
trade associated with nontradables  . 
In calculating the cost of  public  funds,  one must  take into account the 
optimal response of the structure of taxation (on incomes from all sources) to 
the liberalization policy because the cost of  public funds is derived from a 
process  of  tax  optimization.  Therefore,  we  also  analyze  the  effect  of 
liberalization on  the  structure of  taxation.  Of  course,  entangled with  the 
structure  of  taxation  is  also  the  issue  of  the  optimal  size  of  income 
redistribution. For this reason, we  also analyze in section 9.5 the effect of 
international  capital  market  liberalization  on  the  optimal  redistribution 
(transfer) policy of the government. 
Finally, integration of  capital markets brings up the issue of international 
tax  coordination. It  turns  out  that  perfect  mobility of  capital necessitates 
some  minimal  degree  of  coordination among the  tax  authorities.  This  is 
discussed in section 9.6. 
We  present  in  section  9.1 the  analytical  framework  for  our  analysis. 
Sections 9.2 and  9.3 discuss  alternative regimes  of  international capital 
mobility. Concluding remarks are included in the final section. 
9.1  The Analytical Framework 
Consider a stylized two-period model of  a small open economy with one 
composite good,  serving both  for private and public  consumption and  for 
investment. In the first period, the economy possesses an initial endowment 
of  the  composite good.  Individuals can  decide how  much  of  their initial 
endowments to consume in the first period and how much to save. Saving is 
allocated to either domestic investment or foreign investment. In the second 
period,  output  (produced by  capital  and  labor) and  income  from  foreign 
investment are allocated between private and public consumption. For  the 
sake of  simplicity, we  assume that  the  government is  active only  in  the 
second period. The government employs taxes on labor, taxes on  income 
from domestic investment, and taxes on income from investment abroad in 
order to finance optimally (taking into account both  efficiency and equity 
considerations) both  its  (public) consumption and  a  (uniform lump-sum) 
subsidy for redistribution purposes. 
For simpiicity, while still capturing real-world basic features, we assume 
that government spending on public goods does not affect individual demand 333  Integration of International Capital Markets 
patterns for private goods or the supply of labor. That is, only the taxes that 
are  needed  to  finance these  expenditures  affect  individual  demands  and 
supplies,  but  not  the  expenditures  themselves.  Formally,  this  feature  is 
obtained by  assuming that the utility function is weakly separable between 
private goods and services, on the one hand, and public goods and services, 
on the other. That is, individual h’s utility is 
where  uh  and  mh are  the  private  and  public  components  of  the  utility 
function,  respectively;  Clh,  C2h,  and  Lh  are  first-period  consumption, 
second-period consumption, and  second-period labor supply,  respectively; 
and G is (second-period) public con~umption.~ 
Denote  saving in the form of  domestic capital by  Kh and saving in the 
form of foreign capital by B,.  The aggregate saving in the form of domestic 
capital is equal to the stock of capital in the second period since we assume 
for concreteness, without affecting the results of the paper, that the patterns of 
capital flows are such that the country is a capital exporter (i.e., c$h  2 0). 
Hence, the budget constraints of  individual h are 
where: 
t  = tax on capital income from domestic sources; 
t’  = tax on capital income from foreign sources; 
8  = tax on labor income; 
S’  = lump-sum subsidy; 
r  = domestic rate of  interest 
r* = foreign rate of  interest (net of taxes levied abroad); 
w  = wage rate; and 
I,  = initial (first-period) endowment. 
Obviously,  in  the  absence  of  quantity  restrictions  on  capital  flows, 
individuals must earn the same net return on both forms of investments, that 
is,  r(l - t) = r*(l - t’). With restrictions on capital flows, the  latter 
equality does not have to hold. In such a case, there is an inframarginal profit 
on  foreign  investment,  resulting  from  the  net  interest  differential.  (This 
differential is equal to the capital export tax rate, which is equivalent to the 
quota on capital exports.) One possibility is for this profit to accrue to the 
individual investors. Another possibility is for the government to tax away 
this  profit  fully.  (This is  the equivalent  capital-export tax  version of  the 
capital-export  quota.)  We  adopt  the  second  possibility,  namely,  that  the 
government chooses the level of the tax on income from foreign investments 
(t‘)  so as to eliminate any inframarginal profits. This implies that, whether or 334  Assaf RazidEfraim Sadka 
not there are restrictions on foreign investment, the government chooses t’ so 
as to maintain the equality r(l -  t) = r*(l -  t’).  That is, the rate of tax on 
income from foreign investment is equal to4 
r* -  r(1 - t) 
r* 
Under this tax scheme, the individual is indifferent between investing at 
home (Kh)  or abroad (Bh), caring only about the level of total investment (K,, 
+ Bh). Thus, at equilibrium, the size of the aggregate domestic capital is 
determined  by  the  demand  for capital  by  domestic  firms.  The  latter  is 
determined by the standard equalization of the marginal product of capital to 
the domestic rate of interest, r. 
We can consolidate the two budget constraints into a single (present-value) 
constraint: 
t’ = 
(4)  Clh + qZC2h  = Ih + qLLh  -k  S, 
where 
(5) 
is the consumer (after-tax) price of second-period consumption, 
(6)  qL = (1 - O)w[l + (1 - t)r]-’ 
is the  consumer price  of  labor,  and S = q2S’ is the present  value  of  the 
subsidy.  Maximization  of  the  utility  function  uh, subject  to  the  budget 
constraint (4),  yields the consumption demand functions 
(7)  i  =  1, 2, 
the labor supply function 
q2 = [I +  (1 -  t)r]-’ 
cih  = cih(q2, qL; Ih + S), 
(8)  Lh  = Lh(q2,  qL; Ih + S), 
and the utility obtained from these demand and supply functions, namely, the 
indirect utility function: 
(9)  vh  = vh(q,,  qL P + S). 
Domestic output (Y)  is produced in the second period by capital and labor, 
according to a constant-returns-to-scale  production function 
(10)  Y  = F(K,  L), 
where K  = ChKh  is the  stock  of  domestic capital,  and L  = XhLh  is the 
aggregate supply of labor. 
The resource constraints of this economy require that 
(1  la)  I  = C,  + B  + K 335  Integration of  International Capital Markets 
and 
(1  1b)  Y  +  (I + r*)B + K  = c2 + G, 
where I  = &,I,,  is aggregate first-period endowment, B  = &,Bh  is aggregate 
investment abroad,  c1 = &c,h  is aggregate consumption in the first period, 
and c2 = C,c,,  is aggregate consumption in the second period. 
Substituting  (2),  (7),  (8),  (lo), and  the  first-period  resource  constraint 
(Lla) into the second-period resource constraint (1  1  b) yields the equilibrium 
condition: 
Observe  that  aggregate  consumptions,  C, and  C,,  depend  not  only  on 
aggregate income but also on its distribution. 
9.2  International Capital Flows: Alternative Regimes 
We consider two alternative regimes. In the first regime, the government sets 
quantity restrictions on capital exports. In the second regime,  there  are no 
restrictions on capital exports, and B is thus determined by market clearance. 
The optimal tax/transfer policy and provision of public goods are obtained 
as  a  solution  to  the  program  of  maximizing  the  indirect  social  welfare 
function 
subject to the resource constraint (12). In this setup, common in the public 
finance  literature,  the  government  operates  directly,  not  on  private-sector 
quantities,  but  rather on prices  (through taxes) that  affect these quantities. 
The government tax policy focuses on q2,  qL,  and S as the control variables. 
In the first regime, we treat B as a parameter.  In the second regime, B is also 
a control endogenous variable. Notice, however, that this does not mean that 
the  government  directly determines the  level  of  investment abroad; rather, 
the government,  through  its  tax  policy,  affects total  savings  (K + B) and 
domestic investment (K),  and B  is determined as a residual (the difference 
between total savings and domestic investment). 
Notice that, by Walras law, the government budget constraint is satisfied. 
Also, the wage rate (w)  and the domestic rate of interest (I)  are determined 
by  the  standard  marginal  productivity  conditions:  F, =  r  and  F,  =  w. 
Given q2 and qL,  we can solve for the tax rates, t and 8,  by using (5) and (6). 336  Assaf RazidEfraim Sadka 
9.3  Efficient Capital Flows 
Since  there  are  distortionary  taxes  as  part  of  the  optimal  program, 
obviously  the  resource  allocation  is not  Pareto  efficient:  the  intertemporal 
allocation of consumption,  the leisure-consumption choice, and the private- 
public  consumption  trade-offs  are  all  distorted.  Nevertheless,  the  fully 
optimal  program  (namely,  the  second  regime,  where  no  restrictions  on B 
exist) requires an efficient allocation of capital between investment at home 
and  abroad,  so that  F, =  r*. That is, the  marginal  product  of  domestic 
capital must be equated to the foreign rate of return on capital (net of foreign 
taxes). 
To see this, observe that the endogenous variable B does not appear in the 
objective  function  (13),  so  that  the  first-order  conditions  for  optimality 
require that the derivative of  the resource constraint (12) with respect to B, 
that is,  -F, + (1 + r*) - 1, be equal to zero. Hence, F, = r*. Evidently, 
this  is  an  open  economy  variant  of  the  aggregate  efficiency  theorem  in 
optimal tax theory (see Diamond and Mirrlees  1971; Sadka 1977; and Dixit 
1985). 
Notice  also that  this  production-efficiency  result  also implies  that  there 
should be  no differential  tax treatment  of  foreign  and domestic  sources of 
income, namely: 
t  = t'. 
It  might  be  argued  that  our investment  efficiency  result  (i.e.,  equating 
the  return  on capital  at home  to the return  on capital  abroad by  means  of 
free  international  capital  flows)  is  not  valid  when  the  government  is 
concerned about financing its debt. Because, the opening of an economy to 
international  capital  flows  will  raise  the  domestic  interest  rate  (r) to  the 
world  rate  (r*). In  such  a  case,  a  government  that  is  burdened  by  an 
ongoing  deficit  incurs  a  higher  interest  cost  of  financing  this  deficit.  In 
fact, it loses some of its monopsony power in the domestic capital market. 
It  can  then  be  argued  in  this  case  that  the  government  may  not  wish  to 
allow  residents  to  invest  abroad.  To  analyze  this  issue,  we  extend  our 
model  in  Appendix  A  in  order  to  incorporate  a  meaningful  role  for  a 
government  debt in a non-Ricardian  framework.  We  show that  the  invest- 
ment  efficiency  result  is  still  valid  nevertheless.  This  is  because  the 
government  can  offset  the  cost  of  losing  its  monopsony  power  by  an 
appropriate tax policy. 
However, in the presence of restrictions on capital exports, the production 
efficiency result does not necessarily hold: the return to capital at home may 
be  lower than  the  net  (after  foreign  taxes)  return  on  investment  abroad. 
Nevertheless,  a small relaxation  of this restriction will improve welfare. 
We turn next to the study of the effects on the fiscal branch of relaxing the 
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9.4  The Cost of Public Funds in an Open Economy 
In  the presence of  distortionary  taxes,  the  social cost  of  an  additional 
dollar  raised  by  taxes  (namely,  the  marginal  cost  of  public  funds)  may 
exceed one dollar owing to the existence of excess burden (deadweight loss) 
of taxation. The optimal provision of public goods is determined by equating 
their marginal benefit with the marginal cost of public funds. In this section, 
we  directly  examine  the  effect  of  relaxing  the  restrictions  on  B  on  the 
optimal level of G. Since we have assumed that the marginal benefit from G 
is diminishing (a concave m),  it follows that the optimal G increases if  and 
only if  the marginal cost of public funds declines. In this way we indirectly 
analyze the effect of  a liberalization of  the international capital markets on 
the marginal cost of public funds. 
For  this  purpose,  we  treat  B  as  a  parameter  and  examine  the  effect 
of  changing B  on  the  optimal  quantity  of  the  public  good.  Specifically, 
the optimal level of  the public good is a function of  B, denoted by  G(B). 
We  then  look  for the  sign of  dGldB in the region where F, = r < r*, 
so  that  increasing  B  enhances  production  efficiency  and,  thus,  social 
welfare. 
We  proceed as follows. For given levels of G and B, let us maximize the 
private component of W in (13) (namely, Xc,y,v,[q2, qL;  I), + S]), subject to 
the resource constraint (12). Denote the value of the maximand by N(B, G). 
Then, for a given B,  the optimal G is determined by  solving 
(14)  m$N(B,  GI  + M(G)I, 
where M(G) = ChYhmh(G). 
The first-order condition is 
(15)  N2 + M'  = 0, 
and the second-order condition is 
(16) 
Totally differentiating (1  5) with respect to B yields 
NZ2  + M" 5  0. 
N12  _-  -  dG 
dB  -(NZ2 + M")' 
By  (16), the denominator in (17) is positive. Hence, 
Sign (2)  -  = Sign(N,,). 
To  proceed  further,  at  this  point,  we  first  abstract  from  redistribution 
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9.4.1  Efficiency Considerations 
Suppose that  all individuals  are alike so that  we may  consider a  single 
representative individual and drop the index h. (Alternatively, we may assume 
that redistribution can be done by nondistortionary means.) Alleviating the 
constraint on foreign lending affects the optimal size of government through 
two channels. First, increasing B generates an additional source of revenues 
for the government, thereby allowing lower taxes on existing sources. This 
tends to lower the marginal cost of public funds (and raise the size of gov- 
ernment). Second, increasing B may adversely affect the internal terms of trade 
(associated with nontradable factors or goods) for government expenditures. 
This effect can raise the marginal cost of  public funds (and lower the size of 
government). To  highlight  these two effects,  we  consider first in the next 
subsection the pure income effect. 
Constant Internal Terms of  Trade 
Assume a linear production function, yielding constant real factor prices: 
f(5 r*) and  W,  for  capital  and  labor,  respectively.  In  this  case,  we  can 
unambiguously show that N,, > 0 and, consequently, that dGfdB > 0. 
The function N(B, G) is defined in this case by 
N(B,  G) =  max  v(q2,  qL;  I  + S) 
1Q2’  qL. SI 
subject to 
81  - cl(q2,  qL; I  + S) -  BI  + *Uqz,  qL; I  + S) 
+ [I -  Cl(q,,  qL;  1 + S) -  B] + (1 + r*)B 
- C&2,  qL; I  + S) - G = 0. 
Hence, by the envelope theorem, we obtain 
(20)  N2(B, G) = - X(B, G) 5  0, 
where X(B,  G) 2 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint 
in (19). From (20), 
(21)  N21(B, GI  =  -hi(B, GI. 




N,(B,  G) = X(B,  G)(r* - 7) 2 0. 
NII(B,  G) = XI@,  G)(r*  - i). 
One can show (see App. B) that N (., .) is concave. Hence, N,, < 0, and 
it follows from (23) that A, < 0. Thus, (21) implies that N2, > 0. Therefore, 
dG/dB > 0. That is, the relaxation  of  international  capital controls, in the 339  Integration of  International Capital Markets 
absence of adjustment in the internal terms of trade, lowers the marginal cost 
of  public funds and increases the optimal size of  government. 
Variable Internal Terms of  Trade 
To  analyze the effect of variable internal terms of  trade on government’s 
expenditures in  a  simple manner,  we  assume that  labor, the  nontradable 
factor of  production,  exhibits diminishing marginal productivity and  that 
government’s expenditures are used entirely to hire labor. Specifically, we 
continue to assume constant internal intertemporal terms of  trade,  that is, 
that  r  is  constant  (at  the  level  J).  However,  in  the  second  period, 
consumption can be provided (in addition to being transferred from the first 
period) by  a concave production function, f(L),  using labor alone. The rent 
(pure profit) generated by such a technology is assumed to be fully taxed by 
the government. The government hires LG  units of labor in the second period 
at  the  prevailing wage,  w  = f’;  the  government does not  purchase  any 
quantity of the consumption good. We  thus replace G by  LG. 
In this case, the function N(B, LG) is defined by 
Following the same procedure as in the preceding subsection, we conclude that 
The first term in the expression for N21  is similar to (21). As before, it is 
straightforward to show that  A, < 0, so that  this  term contributes toward 
making N,,  positive, that  is, toward  increasing the size of  government in 
response to alleviating controls on foreign lending (see eq.  [17]).  However, 
the second term may work in the opposite direction: the pure income effect 
of raising B tends to increase the consumption of leisure, thereby increasing 
the cost of  labor that the government hires. Thus, the optimal LG  (namely, 
the real magnitude of government’s consumption) may at the end decline in 
response to a liberalization of  the international capital market. Note, how- 
ever, that if  capital and labor are substitutes in production, capital exports 
tend to lower the wage rate and thus lower the cost of public funds. 
9.4.2  Redistribution Considerations 
Now,  let us return to the framework of  the first subsection of  9.4.1 and 
reintroduce the redistribution motive. 340  Assaf RazidEfraim Sadka 
To  simplify  the  exposition,  suppose that  the  economy  consists of  two 
individuals (or two classes of individuals), denoted by  indices A  and B. We 
further simplify the analysis by assuming a fixed labor supply (and dropping 
it  altogether from the  model).  Thus,  we  are left only with  intertemporal 
decisions and tax-induced intertemporal distortions. Still, to proceed further, 
we  employ  a  log-linear  utility  function,  in  order  to  keep  the  analysis 
tractable. 
To  emphasize  the  equity  issues,  we  consider  the  extreme  case  of  a 
max-min social welfare criterion; that is, we  assume for the social welfare 
function in (13) that ye = 0 and yA = 1  (where  ZA  <  ZB). The function N,  the 
maximized value of  the private component in the social welfare function W, 
is defined in this case by 
N(B,  G)  = max{a log[a(zA  + S)] + (1 -  a)log  (24) 
1,s 
[(I -  aMA  + S)(1  +  - d)l) 
subject to 
(1 + ?)[(I,  + 1,)(1 - a) - 2d] 
- (1 - a)[1 +  F(1 -  t)](zA  + 1,  + 2s) 
+ (r* - F)B - G = 0, 
where the log-linear individual utility function is given by 
(25)  u(c,,  c2) = a log c1 + (1 -  a)log c2. 
Employing the constraint to eliminate S, we can reduce (24) to 
(26)  N(B,  G)  = MaX{lOg[uA(1  + F)  + t(1 - a)F(I, -  [A) 
+ (r* -  F)B - GI - log[l  + T.(l -  (1 - a)t)] 
+  (1 - a)log[1 + ?(I - t)] + constant} 
= max H(t,  B, GI. 
The first-order condition for t is 
(27)  Hi(t,  B,  G)  = 0, 
while the second-order condition is 
(28) 
By the envelope theorem, 
Hll(r,  B, C) I  0. 
NIP,  GI  = HAt, By  GI; 
hence, 
at 
(29)  N12  = H21z  + H23. 341  Integration of  International Capital Markets 
Total differentiation of  (27)  with respect to B yields 
Hence, from (29)  and (30),  we obtain the expression for N,,  as follows: 
H12H13  -  H23H11 
-HI1 
N12  = 
Since H,, < 0 (by [28]),  it follows that 
(32)  Sign(N12) = Sign(H12H13 -  H23H11). 
Using the definition of H (namely, eq.  [26])  to find the partial derivatives 
H,,  we substitute these derivatives into (32). This substitution yields 
(33) 
1  -  (1 - 4 
sign{[,  + F(1 - t)]*  [1  +  - (1 - a)t)12 
(see App. C). 
dGldB >  O? 
Since 0 < 1  - (Y  < 1, it  follows that  (33) is positive and hence that 
9.5  Tax Structure and Redistribution in an Open Economy 
In this section, we examine the effects of relaxing some of the controls on 
international  capital  flows  on  the  structure  of  taxation  and  the  size  of 
redistribution. We  continue to adopt the simplified framework of  subsection 
9.4.2.  Assume  further  that  the  public  component in  the  utility  function 
mA(G)  is equal to 6 log G. In this case, the optimal policy is the solution to 
the following problem: 
max{H(r, B,  G) + 6 log G}, 
{r,G)  (34) 
where H(.)  is defined in (26). 
As  before, B  is a parameter, and we consider the relations between this 
parameter and  the optimal values of  t  and  G  (denoted by  t[B]  and  G[B], 
respectively). In doing so, we also find the effect of  changing B on t'  and S, 
as will be shown later. 
The first-order conditions are 
(35) 
(36) 
Hl(t,  B, G) = 0, 
6 
G  H3(t, B,  G) + -  = 0. 
Total differentiation of  (35)-(36)  with respect to B yields 342  Assaf RazidEfraim Sadka 
dl  1 
(37) 
where A is positive by the second-order conditions for the solution to (34).6 
In Appendix C, we show that 
-  dB  = ,(-H12H33  -+  H,,H,,  + H,$/G2), 
(38)  -H,2H33  + H13H23  = 
and 
(39)  H,, < 0. 
Hence, dildB < 0. 
Thus, relaxing the controls on investments abroad reduces the optimal rate 
of tax on income from domestic investment. This is a natural result in view 
of the  fact that relaxing  the  controls improves welfare.  Since t'  =  [r* - 
(1 - t)f]/r*,  it follows that t'  should be lowered too. That is, the optimal 
response to relaxing the restrictions on investments abroad is to lower the tax 
on income from such investments. 
To find dSldB, recall that the constraint in (24) was employed in order to 
solve for S in terms of t, B, and G: 
S=  (40) 
Ft(1 -  &)(I,  + I,)  + (r* - F)B - G 
2{1  + F[l  - (1 - u)t]} 
We  have already concluded that an increase in B raises  G and  lowers t. 
These changes have conflicting  effects on S, as can be  seen from (40). We 
employed  numerical  calculations  to demonstrate  the  effect  of  raising B on 
the optimal S.  These calculations suggest that raising B increases the size of 
the demogrant S. Again, this result is natural in view of the fact that relaxing 
the restrictions on international capital flows improves the efficiency of total 
investment,  thereby  enabling  the  economy  to  devote  more  resources  for 
redistribution of income. (Note that, if the government does not tax away the 
inframarginal profits arising from the quota due to the budget constraint,  S 
must decline when G rises and t falls.) 
The results of  the numerical  calculations are given in table 9.1. 
9.6  Capital Mobility and International Tax Coordination 
Capital market integration between two large countries brings out the issue 
of  tax coordination between them.  When residents of  one country invest in 
the other country, one must reckon with the possibility  of tax arbitrage that 
may  undermine the  feasibility  of  integration.  It  is quite obvious that  some 
coordination between countries may in general improve the welfare  of  both 
countries.  In  the  case  of  tax  coordination,  however,  we  show  that 
coordination  is  essential  for  a  sensible  world  equilibrium  (with  nonzero 
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Table 9.1  The Effect of  Capital Controls on the Optimal Supply of the Public 
Good (G), on the Tax Rates (t and t'), and on the Demogrant (S) 
B  G  t  t'  S 
0  ,191  1.  399a  1.266'  .381 
.25  ,193  1.391"  1.261"  ,402 
Note:  Parameter values: a = 0.6, 6 = 0.05,  P  = 0.50, r*  = 0.75, I,  = 1.0,  IB = 3.0, W = 
UA =  dog  +  Cf  +  (1 - a)logC$  +  6 logG. 
aNote that physical investment and foreign lending are the only forms of  transferring resources 
from the present to the future. Hence, t and t'  may well exceed one, as long as 1 + (1 -  t)P 
and  1 + (1 -  t')r* are still positive. 
To  highlight this issue, consider a two-country world with perfect capital 
mobility.  Denote  the  interest  rates  in  the  home  country  and  the  foreign 
country by  r and r*, respectively. In principle, the home country may  have 
three different tax rates applying to interest income: 
i.  tRD  = the  tax  rate  levied  on  domestic  residents  on  their  domestic- 
ii.  t,,  = the tax rate levied on domestic residents on their foreign-source 
111.  tNRD = the tax rate levied on nonresidents on their interest income in 
The foreign country may  correspondingly have  three tax  rates,  which  we 
denote by  fiD, t&,  and fhRD.  Furthermore,  let  us  assume that  these rates 
apply  symmetrically for  both  interest  earned  and  interest paid  (i.e.,  full 
deductibility of  interest expenses, including tax rebates). 
A complete integration of  the capital markets between the two countries 
(including the possibility of  borrowing in one country in order to  invest in 
the other country) requires, owing to arbitrage possibilities, the fulfillment of 
the following conditions: 
source income; 
income; and 




The  first  condition  applies  to  the  residents  of  the  home  country,  and  it 
requires  that  they  be  indifferent  between  investing  at  home  or  abroad. 
Otherwise, they can borrow an infinite amount in the low (net of tax) interest 
rate  country in order to  invest an infinite amount in the high (net of  tax) 
interest rate country. The second condition similarly applies to the residents 
of the foreign country. 
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the only solution to the linear system of equations (41)-(42)  is a zero rate of 
interest in each country: 
r=r*=O 
Since this  is  impossible,  some  international  tax  coordination  is  needed  in 
order to satisfy (43) and yield a sensible world equilibrium. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the two most common  polar  schemes of  source- 
based  or origin-based  taxation are examples  of  workable  tax  coordinations 
(although by no means globally efficient arrangements),  even when the two 
countries do not adopt the same scheme. Consider first the case in which both 
countries adopt the source-based  tax scheme. In this case, income is taxed 
according to its source, regardless of the origin of the taxpayer. This implies 
that 
(44)  tRD  = tNRD9  t&D = thRD9  tRF = t&  = 0, 
so that (43) is satisfied and we can have a world equilibrium  with positive 
rates of  interest. 
Similarly, consider the case in which both countries adopt the origin-based 
tax  scheme:  income  is  taxed  according  to  the  origin  of  the  taxpayer, 
regardless of its source. This implies that 
(45)  tRD  = tRF,  t&D = t&F?  t,RD  = &RD  = 0, 
so that, again, (43) is satisfied. 
Next, consider the case in which one country adopts one tax scheme while 
the other adopts another one. Suppose, for instance,  that the home country 
adopts  the  origin-based  tax  scheme  while  the  foreign  county  adopts  the 
source-based tax scheme. In this case, we have 
and, again, (43) is satisfied. 
However, if the two countries do not stick to one or the other of the two 
polar  schemes, then (43) need not hold, and no sensible world equilibrium 
exists.  Suppose, for instance,  that each country levies the same tax rate on 
its  residents  (irrespective  of  the  source  of  their  income)  and  also  on  all 
nonresidents investing in that country. In this case, we have 
(47)  tRD  = tRF  = tNRD,  tiD = tiF = th;RD. 
Hence,  unless  (1  -  tNRD) (1  -  thRD) =  1, which  is just  a  sheer 
coincidence, condition (43) is violated. 
Thus, some tax coordination is essential for a full capital market integration. 
Any mutually beneficial tax coordination must satisfy the tax arbitrage condition 
(43). In Razin and Sadka (1989b) we found that tax competition among countries 
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9.7  Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed the policy implications of the integration of  the 
international capital markets. Special attention was paid to the effects on the 
marginal cost of  public  funds,  a crucial factor in the determination of  the 
optimal  size of  government and  the  magnitude of  income redistribution. 
Inherent in the determination of the cost of public funds is the design of  the 
structure of  taxation (on labor income, domestic-source capital income, and 
foreign-source capital income). 
We  show that it  is not efficient to impose restrictions on capital exports 
and  that  every  incremental  move  toward  a  more  liberalized  policy 
concerning the  international  flows  of  capital  is  welfare  improving.  This 
result depends crucially, however, on the assumption that  the government 
can effectively tax foreign-source income. In Rain and Sadka (1989a,b), we 
consider the case  in  which  the  government cannot effectively tax  capital 
income from foreign sources. 
In the context of  a world economy with integrated capital markets, there 
arises the issue of international tax coordination. This issue has two aspects. 
First is the elementary problem of what international tax arrangements are at 
all viable in the wake of capital market arbitrage possibilities. This issue was 
dealt with  in  this paper.  A second aspect (dealt with in  Razin  and  Sadka 
1989b)  is  the  determination  of  mutually  beneficial  international  tax 
arrangements from the set of  viable arrangements. 
Appendix A 
In this appendix, we prove that N(B, G)  is concave. Recall that N(B, G)  is 
defined  by  (19).  Since  there  is  only  one  individual  and  a  lump-sum 
taxhbsidy is allowed, it follows that the government can choose any bundle 
(Cl, C,, L)  that is feasible (i.e., that satisfies the resource constraint in [19]). 
Thus, N  may be equivalently defined by 
N(B,  G)  =  Max  u(C1,  Cz, L) 
C1’ CZ’ L 
subject to 
?(I -  C1 -  B) + GL. + I -  C1 + r*B -  C2 - G 2  0. 
We  have to show that 
N[aB’ + (1 -  a)B”,  aG’  + (1 -  a)G”] 
2 d(B’,  G’)  + (1 -  a)N(B”,  G”) 
for all (B‘, G’), (B”, G),  and 0 5  a 5  1. 
Suppose that the bundle (Cfl,CrZ,  L‘)  is a solution to (Al) for (B, G) = 346  Assaf RazidEfraim Sadka 
(B’,  G’) and that the bundle (C”,, C2,  L”)  is a solution to (Al) for (B, G) = 
(B”,  G”), namely,N(B’, G’) = u(C’,,C‘~,  L’)  and N(B“,  G”) = u(C”,,Cff2,  L”). 
By being solutions to optimum problems,  the bundles (C1,  CI2,  L’)  and 




?(I -  C’l -  B’) + GL’  + I - C’,  + r*B’ - C2  - G’ 2 0 
i-(I - C’’,  -  B”) + GI,”  + I - C”i + r*B“ - C’12 -  G” 2 0. 
Hence, on multiplying (A2) by the factor a and (A3) by the factor (1 -  a) 
and adding them together, it follows that 
(‘44)  ?{I - [UC’, + (1 -  a)c”,] -  [UB‘  + (1 -  a)B”]} 
+ O[d’ + (1 -  a)L”]  + I -  [UC’, + (1 - a)C”J 
+ r*[aB‘ + (I -  a)B”] -  [aC’,  + (1 -  aC”J 
- [uG’  + (1 -  a)G”] 2 0. 
Thus, the bundle [aC‘, + (1 -  a)  C”,,  aCf2  + (1 -  c)C2, aL’ + (1 -  a)L”l 
is feasible for (B, G) = [aB‘ + (1 - a)B”,  uG’  + (1  -a)G“].  Therefore, 
(A51  N[uB’ + (1 -  a)B’’, uG’ +  (1 -  a)G”] 
2 u[aC’, + (1 - a)C”,,  aC’2  + (1 -  a)C”2,  UL’  + (1 - a)L”] 
2 au(C’,,  c2,  L’) + (1 -  a)u(C”,,  C”*,  L”) 
= uN(B’,  G’) + (1 -  a)N(B”,  G”), 
where the first inequality in (A5) follows from the definition of N(.,  .) as the 
value of the maximand in (Al), and the second inequality  follows from the 
concavity of  u. This completes the proof of the concavity of N. 
Appendix B 
In  this  appendix  we  verify  the  expressions  of  (33)  and  (38)-(39).  The 
function H  (see [26]) is given by 
(B1)  H(t,  B, G) = log[2IA(1 +  T-)  + t(I - a)F(Z, -  I,) 
+ (r* - T-)B  -  GI - log(1 + ~-[l  - (1 -  a)t]) 
+ (1 -  a)log[l  + i-(1 - t)]. 
The first-order derivatives are 
(B2)  = [21,4(1 + ?) + t(1 -  a)F(zB -  IA) 
+ (r* - i-)B - G](1 - a)T-(ZB  -  IA) 
+ (1  + r[1 - (1 -  a)t]}-’T-(l - a) 
-  r(1 - a)[(l  + T-(1 -  t)]-1, 347  Integration of  International Capital Markets 
(B3)  H2 = [2f,4(1 + f)  + t(1 -  cW)?(z~  - IA) 




r* -  i- 
H3 = --. 
The second-order derivatives are: 
Hence, 
H12,  H13  -  Hll, H33 
1 
[2Z~(l  + T) + t(l - a)T.(f, -  f,)  + (r* -  T-)B -  GI2 
This completes the proof of  (33). 
find that 
Next we prove (38) and (39). Employing (B6), (B7), (B9), and (BIO), we 
which proves (38). From (B6), we observe that HI,  < 0, which proves (39). 348  Assaf RazidEfraim Sadka 
Notes 
1. In a recent paper,  Micossi (1988) provides a succinct survey of the proposed 
institutional  arrangements  for  the  1992  European  integration.  He  writes,  “The 
European  integration  entails  the  elimination  of  restrictions  and  discriminatory 
regulations and administrative practices concerning: (i) the right of establishment and 
acquisition of participations by foreign institutions in domestic financial markets; (ii) 
permitted  operations  of  foreign-controlled  financial  institutions;  (iii)  cross-border 
transactions in financial services. The first two items basically involve the freedom to 
supply  services  in  EC  national  markets,  the  third,  the  freedom  to  move  capital 
throughout the Community.” 
2.  For  an  earlier  discussion  of  the  interaction  among  taxes,  government 
consumption, and international capital flows, see Rain and Svensson (1983). 
3.  To ensure diminishing marginal rates of substitution between private and public 
commodities, we assume, as usual, that uh and mh are strictly concave. 
4.  An  equivalent policy to taxing away the  inframarginal profits (resulting from 
the net interest differential) is to auction off the quotas on investment abroad. 
5.  The reader who is familiar with the optimal income tax literature may realize 
that the issue of  the  sign of  dGldB  is related  to the  issue of  the concavity of  the 
maximized (reduced-form) social welfare function with respect to tax revenues (see 
Baker and Sadka 1982; and Stiglitz 1982). 
6.  The derivative dGldB is negative,  as shown in sec. 9.4.2. 
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Comment  Jack M. Mintz 
The paper by  Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka raises an interesting issue for 
countries that relax capital controls. What effect do such policies have on the 
optimal fiscal decisions of  a benevolent government? Their main result is 
that a government may reduce the capital income tax rate and, under certain 
circumstances, expand government expenditures if capital controls are relaxed. 
With respect to the latter, relaxing capital controls on exported savings reduces 
the marginal cost of public revenues, thus allowing government expenditure 
to increase, but it may increase the price of nontraded goods (i.e., labor) used 
in public production and hence, possibly reduce the expansion of  the gov- 
ernment sector. 
The above results are not intuitively obvious, at least to me, at first glance. 
In these remarks, I will offer an alternative explanation of  the Razin-Sadka 
results in a simpler version of their model. Despite the simplicity of my  own 
model, I will be able to derive similar efficiency results but with an interpre- 
tation that varies from that offered by the authors. Of  course, the model can 
be extended in other ways, as suggested by  Razin and Sadka. 
In my discussion below, I will also raise a number of other points that are 
important in determining the effect of capital controls on the fiscal decisions 
of  open economies. Although I agree with the Razin-Sadka analysis, I find 
that it neglects several important issues that are of interest to policymakers. 
In particular, they examine a capital exporting country that finances a public 
consumption good  using  labor and  capital income taxes on residents.  No 
interaction effects with other countries are considered. Savings are invested 
in  domestic  and  foreign  assets  that  are  perfect  substitutes,  and  the 
international interest rate on foreign assets is exogenous to the small open 
economy. I wish to extend the Razin-Sadka analysis to consider the effect of 
the capital controls on fiscal decisions in the following contexts: (i) countries 
are capital importers as well as exporters, (ii) capital income taxes apply at 
the firm level and are imposed on nonresidents, and (iii) tax and regulatory 
policies  affect  not  only  the  welfare  of  the  country  imposing  the  tax  or 
regulation but  also the welfare of  other countries. The latter topic may be 
important for considering the fiscal effect of capital market integration in the 
European Economic Community. 
Capital Importing versus Capital Exporting Considerations 
Fiscal decisions often differ considerably for capital exporting and capital 
importing  nations.  If  the  Razin-Sadka  analysis  is  extended  to  a  capital 
Jack  Mintz is professor of business economics, Faculty of Management and Department of 
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importing framework,  what would be  the optimal tax  decisions, and how 
would a government react if  capital restrictions on imports are relaxed? 
To  answer  these  questions,  I  will  consider  a  simpler  form  of  the 
Rain-Sadka model. In particular, I shall assume that labor is fixed in supply 
(so  a wage tax is a lump-sum tax). I will also assume that all individuals are 
identical in the country and that utility is an additive function defined over 
first- and second-period consumption goods and the public good. In addition, 
utility is linear in second-period consumption goods (so there are no income 
effects on savings). I also assume that the capital income tax on foreign and 
domestic savings is identical, which is a special case of the Ruin and Sadka 
model. 
Following the Razin-Sadka analysis, consider an economy that may be (i) 
a capital exporter facing restrictions on capital exports, B,  or (ii a capital 
importer  facing  restrictions  on  capital  imports,  B_.  Let  I  denote  the 
endowment of  wealth in the first period, c1 and c2 first- and second-period 
consumption, respectively, G consumption of  the public good, K  domestic 
capital stock, B net foreign assets (B = A - c, -  K),  I* the international 
interest rate, t the capital income tax rate, and T lump-sum taxes. The market 
equilibrium for the economy can be described as solutions to the following 
problem: 
subject to 
c2 = K  + (1 -  t)f(K)  + [l  + r*(l -  f)]B -  T,  - 
B  = I -  c1 -  K I  B, 
B  = I - c1 -  K 2 B. 
The first-order conditions for this problem yield the familiar results that the 
marginal rate of substitution would be equal to, less than, or greater than [  1 
+ r*( 1 -  t)]  for the cases of  <  B* <  B_ (unconstrained capital importer or 
exporter), B  =  (constrained capital exporter),  and B  =  (constrained 
capital importer),  respectively. The firm’s capital stock decision would be 
governed by the condition that the marginal productivity of capital,f’, equals 
the (gross of personal tax) “domestic”  interest rate, r (which, net of personal 
taxes, is equal to the time preference rate). In the unconstrained case, this 
implies r =  r*,  given the same tax rate imposed on domestic and foreign capital 
income. For the constrained capital exporter, r < r* (as suggested by Razin 
and Sadka), and, for the constrained capital importer, r > r*. 
What are the optimal fiscal decisions for the government given the capital 
controls on net foreign assets B? To  obtain the optimal fiscal decisions, t*, 
G*, and T*,  the government maximizes the indirect utility function, V(t,  T, 
G) subject to the second-period budget constraint, G = t[F(K) + r* B] + T. 
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the capital income tax given the absence of income effects. If the country is 
unconstrained, the capital  income tax rate has no effect on the investment 
decision, K. Only savings and net foreign assets are affected. If the country 
is a constrained  capital  exporter,  the capital income tax  reduces  domestic 
savings  and,  subsequently,  investment.  Net  foreign  assets  remain  fixed. 
Finally, if  the country is a constrained capital importer, the capital income 
tax reduces savings and the domestic capital investment since capital imports 
are  fixed  (i.e.,  &,/at  =  aK/& when  B  is  restricted).  Note  that,  in  this 
formulation,  interest  on  foreign  borrowings  is  fully  deducted  from  the 
income tax. 
The  solution  for  the  optimal  capital  tax  rate  for  this  problem  is  the 
following: 
t* = [f(K)  + r*B*](l -  A/+) 
-  dK/dt 
for B* =  or B  -  with 
A=l 
and 
4 = I  + (r -  r*)(l - t)dc,/dt - (f’  -  r*)(l -  t)dK/dt; 
(ii)  t* =OforB_<B*<B. 
Note that A is the marginal utility of the second-period good valued by the 
private sector and that 4 is the social marginal value of tax revenue (used to 
finance public goods in the second period). Conditions (i) and (ii) are readily 
interpreted by considering the effect of a tax on savings on the allocation of 
capital in the economy. 
The optimal capital income tax rate for the unconstrained economy is zero 
(given market equilibrium conditions r  = r*  andf’  = r*  so that + =  X, 
yielding the result in [ii]). This is quite sensible since a capital income tax is 
distortionary and only lump-sum taxes should be imposed. 
When the economies are constrained by capital controls, then the capital 
income tax reduces  savings and, therefore,  investments in domestic assets 
since net foreign assets are constrained either at  or  B_.  For the constrained 
capital exporter, this implies that the social value of public revenue is at least 
as great as the private value + 2 A  since r < r* and f‘ < r*. Thus, given 
dK/dt < 0, the optimal tax rate is positive. For the capital importing country, 
the optimal capital tax rate is negative. 
Intuitively, these results can be explained as follows (see figs.  C9.1 and 
C9.2). If the country is a capital exporter, capital controls subsidize domestic 
investment by forcing domestic savings into the domestic asset, causing the 
gross-of-tax  domestic  interest  to  fall. To  counteract  this  effect,  a  capital 
income tax can be imposed on savings that causes the gross-of-tax domestic 352  Assaf RazidEfraim Sadka 
S=K+E)  K 
Fig. C9.1  Capital exporting country 
Fig. C9.2  Capital importing country 
interest rate to rise,  subsequently reducing domestic investment.  This tax 
causes inframarginal returns on capital investment to  decline by  the  area 
r*rba  in  figure  C9.1.  However,  the  tax  raises  revenue  equal  to  r*rdc, 
yielding a net  gain in welfare indicated by  the area abdc. In principle, the 
capital income tax rate,  in this model, can be raised until r  = r*, which 
would lead to second-best efficiency. 
For  a  capital  importing  country,  the  opposite  results  hold.  Domestic 
capital investment is discouraged since capital controls cause the domestic 
interest  to  rise  above  the  world  interest  rate.  Instead  of  taxing  capital, 
savings are subsidized since the  domestic gross-of-tax interest rate  is too 
high. As shown in figure C9.2, the gain in rents to capital is r*rcd, and the 
cost of the subsidy is rr*bu, yielding a net welfare gain of ubcd. 353  Integration of  International Capital Markets 
This  model,  although  somewhat  special,  does  illustrate  the  efficiency 
results obtained in  the Razin-Sadka paper.  A  reduction in  capital controls 
(through a higher 3 in the case of capital exporting country or lower B_ in the 
case of capital importing country) lowers the optimal corporate tax rate. This 
can be easily demonstrated by noting that the domestic interest rate, r, moves 
closer to the international interest rate r*  (in both eq. [i] and [ii] and in the 
corresponding figures).  However,  the  intuition provided  here  is  different 
from that explained by  Razin and Sadka. In the above model, government 
expenditures need  not be  affected by  the capital controls (only lump-sum 
taxes may change). Capital income taxes, however, are imposed since they 
correct for imperfections caused by capital controls. This is true even though 
the  tax  system  would  otherwise  be  nondistortionary.  In  fact,  this  model 
would lead to a comer solution-the  optimal tax rate is set until r =  f’ = I* 
(this would not necessarily be the case in the Razin-Sadka model). 
The above illustrates two issues that would be of  interest to explore that 
are not discussed in Razin and Sadka. The first is that capital controls for a 
capital importing country imply that a country would subsidize savings and 
labor if  a lump-sum tax  could be  imposed. The second is that  it may  be 
possible for regimes to change in that the use of the fiscal system may move 
a  country  from  a  constrained to  an  unconstrained equilibrium  in  capital 
markets.  This  could  be  efficient,  suggesting  the  possibility  that  the  tax 
system might make capital controls ineffective. 
The Role of Corporate and Withholding Taxes 
In the Razin and Sadka model, and the one discussed above, the capital 
income tax can be viewed as personal tax on domestic and foreign-source 
income. When a personal income tax is imposed in a capital exporting country 
and net exports of capital are constrained, domestic savings fall, and, as aresult 
of rising interest rates, domestic capital investment also declines. If a corporate 
tax is imposed on domestic investment of firms (and leaves net foreign assets 
of  households free of  tax),  domestic investment declines. The demand for 
foreign assets increases, but households are restricted from purchasing foreign 
assets. Their consumption of  the first-period good thus increases,  causing 
savings to decline and the interest rate to rise. A similar story holds for the 
capital importing country in that personal and corporate taxhubsidies have a 
similar effect on the equilibrium. These results suggest that aggregate effects 
of corporate and personal tax policies in a small open economy can be equiv- 
alent when capital controls are binding. 
The above result, obtained in the Razin-Sadka paper, is quite interesting 
since it is well known that the effects of corporate and personal tax policies 
in  a  small  open  economy  are  not  equivalent  when  there  are  no  capital 
controls (see Boadway, Bruce, and Mintz 1984; and Bovenberg et al. in this 
volume).  A  personal  tax  on  capital  income  causes  domestic  savings to 354  Assaf RazidEfraim Sadka 
decline, but  not  investment.  For  a  capital  exporting country,  net  foreign 
assets held by the economy decline, and, for a capital importing country, net 
foreign borrowings rise. If a corporate tax is imposed, the result is different. 
A  corporate  tax  causes  capital  investment  to  decline,  but  not  domestic 
savings. A capital exporting country  increases  its net foreign assets, and a 
capital importing country reduces its net foreign borrowings. In the presence 
of  lump-sum  taxes,  neither  tax  is optimal. A  small  open economy  would 
“shoot itself in the foot” by taxing capital income either at the corporate or 
at  the  personal  level.  Without  lump-sum  taxes,  a  personal  tax  on capital 
income may be optimal, but not a corporate tax, since productive efficiency 
is maintained,  a familiar point made by Razin and Sadka in their paper. 
The Razin-Sadka  model does not address the implications of nonresident 
withholding  taxes  imposed  by  capital  importing  countries  when  fiscal 
decisions  are made in  the  presence  of  capital  controls.  This is  somewhat 
unfortunate  since withholding  taxes  may  offset  the  gains that  arise  from 
capital taxation  when capital controls are imposed.  A withholding  tax  paid 
by  lenders  to  foreign  countries  is  usually  credited  against  home  tax 
liabilities,  which  implies  that  the  combined domestic  and  foreign  tax  on 
foreign-source  income  is  equal  to  the  domestic  tax  on  domestic-source 
income.  As a result,  the household  faces the same budget  constraint  when 
withholding taxes are imposed, but the government faces a different budget 
constraint since savings in foreign assets yield less domestic tax. In terms of 
national  income, savings in foreign assets are of less value than savings in 
domestic assets for the capital exporting country. This implies that it may not 
be optimal to impose capital income taxes on savings since the gain in tax 
revenue may not be sufficient to offset the loss of inframarginal rents earned 
by domestic capital investments. Thus, capital taxation may not be desirable 
for the capital exporting country. Similarly, for the capital importing country 
that taxes interest earned by foreigners, a subsidy for domestic savings may 
not be desirable. 
Capital Controls and Fiscal Policy Coordination 
The Razin-Sadka model is a special one in the context of  analyzing capital 
market integration and tax harmonization  since tax and regulatory  competi- 
tion  problems  are  not  particularly  important  in  their  model.  Since  each 
country is assumed to be small, they face a perfectly elastic supply of  capital 
from international markets. As a result, fiscal and regulatory policies chosen 
by one government have no effect on the decisions of others. 
This can be explained as follows. Consider capital controls imposed by a 
capital  exporting  economy.  With  no  other  countries  involved,  a  capital 
importing economy is also constrained by the capital regulations imposed by 
the capital exporting country. However, in the small open economy context, 
the constraint is avoided by the capital importing country since it can obtain 
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regulations  in  one country  cannot  affect  the  welfare  of  the  other,  and  no 
regulatory  competition  problem  exists between  the  countries.  With capital 
tax policies,  the  same argument arises.  One country’s fiscal regime cannot 
affect  the  other since  capital  can be  obtained  from international  markets 
without  affecting the international cost of  funds.  Capital tax competition is 
not a problem either. 
If  all the  above is true, then  why  should the  European nations be  at all 
concerned with regulatory and capital income tax harmonization? Clearly, it 
is  in  the  best  interest  of  each  country  to  avoid  regulatory  constraints  and 
choose  optimal  taxes.  Otherwise,  they  only  make themselves  worse  off. 
Thus,  countries  pursuing  self-interest  would  not  impose  capital  taxes  or 
controls anyway.  It seems to me that the small open economy assumed by 
Razin and Sadka may not be a useful characterization of the issues faced by 
the European Economic Community. 
I can think of two cases in which fiscal and regulatory policy competition 
matters in the sense that one country’s action directly affects the interests of 
another  country.  The  first  case  is  an  obvious  one:  instead  of  assuming 
“smallness,”  one can assume that economies are large relative to each other. 
In  this  case,  a  country  that  restricts  the  exportation  of  capital  causes  the 
international  interest  rate  to  rise,  making  its  own  residents  better  off  but 
making  residents  in  capital  importing  countries  worse  off.  Similarly,  a 
capital importing country that restricts the importation  of  capital forces the 
world interest down, making the capital exporting countries worse off. Thus, 
both  tax  and  regulatory  competition  lead  to  nonoptimal  policies  from  a 
worldwide  efficiency  point  of  view.  It would  be  interesting to know  what 
type  of  coordination  is  needed  in  this  context.  If  countries  only  agree  to 
eliminate capital controls, then to what extent would fiscal policies be used 
to restrict  capital  imports? As Razin  and Sadka note, a country could tax 
foreign-source  income  earned  by  residents  as  an  alternative  to  capital 
regulations. 
A  second  source  of  capital  tax  competition  arises  in  the  context  of 
withholding taxes.  As  Razin  and  Sadka implicitly  note,  withholding  taxes 
imposed by  countries  are not  easy to  incorporate  in  their  model.  As  they 
show,  equilibrium  in  capital  markets  holds  only  if  all  countries  use 
source-based  taxes  (taxes  imposed  on capital  income  generated  at source 
with foreign-source income of residents exempt from tax) or residence-based 
taxes  (capital  income  accruing to nonresidents’  taxes  is exempt, and both 
domestic and foreign-source income is taxed).  Razin  and  Sadka emphasize 
the need for harmonization of capital income taxes to ensure the existence of 
a capital market equilibrium. 
Tax  competition  and  harmonization  problems,  however,  are  not  well 
understood  using  models that  assume that  domestic  and foreign  assets  are 
perfect  substitutes  for  each  country’s  investors.  Instead,  tax  competition 
problems  would  be  more  interesting if  it were  assumed that domestic  and 356  Assaf RazidEfraim Sadka 
foreign assets are not perfect substitutes. This would allow for a financial 
equilibrium in which income generated in different jurisdictions and earned 
by different investors would be taxed at different rates. For example, many 
empirical studies suggest that risk  is country-specific so that domestic and 
foreign assets are not perfect substitutes (for an examination of tax policy in 
this context, see Gordon and Varian  1986). With imperfect substitutability, 
capital income taxes and capital controls imposed by  a country affect the 
rates of return on individual assets and make savers better off and borrowers 
worse off. 
When assets are not perfect substitutes, withholding taxes, such as nonres- 
ident taxes on dividends and interest and corporate income taxes, add another 
element of tax competition since the tax is paid by nonresident investors or, 
in the case of crediting, foreign governments. When there is crediting, a capital 
importing country may obtain a “free lunch”  by imposing a withholding tax 
on nonresidents. This  “free  lunch”  occurs because the capital importing 
country is able to impose a tax that transfers income from the foreign gov- 
ernment treasuries without  affect foreign savings. Thus,  capital importing 
countries find it in their favor to export taxes by taxing nonresidents’ income 
particularly if the tax has no distortionary effects. One would find in this type 
of model that the harmonization of tax bases is important if  countries are to 
reduce  the exportation of  taxes on  nonresidents. This problem goes  well 
beyond the issues of harmonization discussed by Razin and Sadka. 
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